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I. INTRODUCTION
During his confirmation hearings before the United States Senate Judiciary
Committee, then-Judge John Roberts testified that he wanted to be a "modest"
judge.' By this, he appears to have meant a judge who strives to interpret the law
as the lawmakers intended and to provide judicial answers to only the questions
necessary to resolve the case before the court.2 The purpose of this Article is to
consider the implications of this conception of "judicial modesty" for the
constitutional jurisprudence of abortion.
*Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minneapolis, Minn.). The author
served as counsel of record on the amicus brief filed by the Christian Medical & Dental Association in
both Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), and Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007), as
well as counsel of record on the amicus briefs filed by the New Hampshire legislatures and the
governors of Minnesota and North Dakota in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England,
546 U.S. 320 (2006). I am grateful for the warm hospitality extended to me by members of the South
Carolina Law Review during the symposium at which I presented the early draft of this Article.
1. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 158 (2005) [hereinafter
Roberts Confirmation Hearing] (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee, Chief Justice ofthe United
States).
2. Michael J. Gerhardt described the history of the concept of "judicial modesty" in his Robert
S. Marx Lecture at the University of Cincinnati on February 29, 2007. See Michael J. Gerhardt,
ConstitutionalHumility, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 23 (2007).
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Part 11 of this Article will consider whether the Constitution-by its terms,
historical understanding, or previous judicial interpretation-required the Court to
constitutionalize questions related to abortion. My conclusions compel me to join
the legions of legal scholars who have sharply criticized the reasoning employed
by the Court in Roe v. Wade.' Part 11I attempts to determine whether the Court
expanded or limited the impact of Roe's flawed reasoning in its abortion cases
between Roe and Chief Justice Robert's confirmation. The evidence largely
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). It is important to note that these critics include many scholars who
applaud the outcome of Roe, yet are compelled as a matter of academic integrity to admit that the case
is largely unprincipled in its use of legal precedent and reasoning. This is the underlying premise of the
authors writing in support of Roe's outcome in What Roe v. Wade ShouldHave Said (Jack Balkin ed.,
2005). Serious criticism of Roe began almost as soon as the Court announced the decision and has
continued through today. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 27 (1975)
("But if the Court's model statute [on abortion] is generally intelligent, what is the justification for its
imposition? If this statute, why not one on proper grounds of divorce, or on adoption of children?");
MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (1982) (" [Roe] cannot be
explained by reference to any value judgment constitutionalized by the frmners."); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 83 (2005)
("Exemplifying perfectionism at its most extreme, [the Roe decision] raised grave doubts about the
Court's use of the Constitution to solve divisive social controversies."); Robert M. Bryn, An American
Tragedy: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 807, 813 57 (1973) (detailing the
"errors" contained in the Roe decision and concluding that "[b]eneath the surface [of the opinion], there
is little that is not error"); Erwin Chemerinsky, Rationalizing the Abortion Debate: LegalRhetoric and
the Abortion Controversy, 31 BUFF. L. REV. 107 (1982) (reviewing major criticisms of the Roe decision
advanced in legal journals); Joseph W. Dellapenna, Nor Piety nor Wit: The Supreme Court on Abortion,
6 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 379, 384 (1974) ("The [Roe] opinion is reple[te] with irrelevancies, non-
sequiturs, and unsubstantiated assertions. The Court decides matters it disavows any intention of
deciding thereby avoiding any need to defend its conclusions. In the process the opinion simply fails
to convince."); Robert A. Destro, Abortion and the Constitution: The Need for a Life-Protective
Amendment, 63 CAL. L. REV. 1250 (1975) (examining the Roe decision and concluding that the Court's
reasoning lacks legal, historical, scientific, and philosophical support); John Hart Ely, The Wages of
Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 943 (1973) ("The problem with Roe is
not so much that it bungles the question it sets itself, but rather that it sets itself a question the
Constitution has not made the Court's business." (footnote omitted)); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes ofPolitics, 114
YALEL.J. 1279, 1312 13 (2005) (characterizing Roe as a "premature" decision by the Supreme Court);
Clarke D. Forsythe & Stephen B. Presser, The Tragic Failure of Roe v. Wade: Why Abortion Should
Be Returned to the States, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 85, 89 (2005) ("[T]he Court's original decisions in
Roe and Doe [v. Bolton] were unconstitutional usurpations of self-government, with no legitimate basis
in substantive due process or constitutional law."); Gerald Gunther, Some Reflections on the Judicial
Role: Distinctions, Roots, and Prospects, 1979 WASH. U. L. REV. 817, 819 ("1 have not yet found a
satisfying rationale to justify Roe v. Wade ... on the basis of modes of constitutional interpretation I
consider legitimate." (footnote omitted)); Charles E. Rice, The Dred Scott Case of the Twentieth
Century, 10 Hous. L. REV. 1059, 1067 (1973) (declaring the Roe decision "erroneous in terms of logic
and constitutional intent"); Lynn D. Wardle, Rethinking Roe v. Wade, 1985 BYU L. REV. 231 (1985)
(arguing that the Supreme Court should reconsider the Roe decision); John T. Noonan, Jr., The Right
to Life: Raw Judicial Power, 25 NAT'L REV. 260, 264 (1973) (calling for a constitutional amendment
reversing Roe). Prior to ascending to the bench of the Supreme Court, one of the Court's most fierce
defenders of a constitutional right to abortion expressed dissatisfaction with the reasoning of Roe. See
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C.
L. REV. 375, 376 (1985) ("Roe v. Wade sparked public opposition and academic criticism ... because
the Court ventured too far in the change it ordered and presented an incomplete justification for its
action." (footnote omitted)); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1185, 1208 (1992) ("Roe ... halted a political process that was moving in a reform direction and
thereby ... prolonged divisiveness and deferred stable settlement of the issue.").
[Vol. 59: 701
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supports the conclusion that the Court expanded its flawed reasoning, reaching new
heights ofjudicial hubris i n Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey4 and new lows in its indifference to the evidentiary record in Stenberg v.
Carhart.5
Part IV then carefully examines Ayotte v. PlannedParenthood ofNorthern New
England6 and Gonzales v. Carhart.7 These are the only two decisions on abortion
that the Court has issued since Chief Justice Roberts assumed leadership of the
Court. These cases appear to foreshadow greater judicial restraint when reviewing
abortion-related legislation, and thus greater freedom for the people and their
elected representatives to decide the proper limits of the state's interest in
protecting women and the unborn life they carry within them.
Part V briefly speculates about the impact of a judicially modest approach in
shaping future abortionj urisprudence. Specifically, Part V predicts fewer successful
facial challenges to abortion regulations; greater emphasis on the requirements of
constitutional and prudential standing; skepticism regarding claims of third-party
representation; and careful review of the evidentiary record offered to support
assertions that contested abortion regulations unduly burden women's liberty when
seeking abortions. Contrary to claims made in abortion activists' hysterical
denunciations of Gonzales'-the Court's decision upholding the Federal Partial-
Birth Abortion Act of 20039 Part VI concludes that ajudicially modest approach
is unlikely to result in the overruling of Roe v. Wade within the foreseeable future.
II. Is ABORTION A CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE?
Clearly, neither the text of the Constitution nor any of its amendments
explicitly address the question of abortion.'0 Nor is there a textual "right to
4. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality).
5. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
6. 546 U.S. 320 (2006).
7. 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
8. See, e.g, AlexiA. Wright & Ingrid T. Katz, Roe Versus Reality: Abortion and Women's Health,
355 N.E. J. MED. 1, 9 (2006), available at http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/full/355/1/1 ("[P]oor
women in rural America are bearing the brunt of these decisions, and some may pay with their lives.");
Robert Barnes, High Court Upholds Curb on Abortion, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2007, at Al (quoting
Nancy Northrup, president of the Center for Reproductive Rights, who characterized the opinion as
'"overturn[ing] three decades of established constitutional law"'); Marie Horrigan, Reaction to Court's
Abortion Ruling Falls Along Predictable Party Lines, CONG. Q., Apr. 18, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/cq/2007/04/18/cq_2588.html (quoting Ellen R. Malcolm, president of
EMILY's List an organization dedicated to electing Democratic women candidates who favor
abortion rights who stated the following: "[The] Bush administration and his court appointees have
so whittled away at the basic reproductive rights of women that Roe is hanging by a thread." (emphasis
added) (internal quotation marks omitted)): Lynn Harris, Supreme Court Upholds Ban on "Partial-
Birth" Abortion, SALON.COM, Apr. 19, 2007, http://www.salon.com/mwt/feature/2007/04/19/
scotus banlprint.html (quoting Eve Gartner, attorney for Planned Parenthood Federation of America,
as predicting, "[T]he [C]ourt in not too long will probably be forced to consider the question of whether
[Roe] is the law of the land.").
9. See Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1627, 1632.
10. This could change if the advocates of the "Human Life Amendment" were to succeed in
enacting a constitutional amendment. See, e.g., Francis J. Beckwith, Disagreement Without Debate: The
Republican Party Platform and the Human Life Amendment, 4 NEXUS 113 (1999) (discussing the
various attempts at "human life amendments" to the Constitution); James Bopp, Jr., An Examination
20081
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privacy" the foundation of the judicially-created right to abortion." The Roe
majority forthrightly acknowledged this fact in its opinion by stating, "The
Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy."' 2
A. Roe's Historical Justification
Finding no warrant in the text of the Constitution to overrule the abortion laws
of forty-six states, 3 the Roe majority turned to the history of abortion: "[W]e have
inquired into, and in this opinion place some emphasis upon, medical and medical-
legal history and what that history reveals about man's attitudes toward the abortion
procedure over the centuries."' 4 More than half of the majority opinion is devoted
to a selective review of ancient and common law beliefs about abortion.' 5 In the
paragraph devoted to "[a]ncient attitudes," Justice Blackmun, writing for the
majority, notes that the views of the ancients on abortion "are not capable of precise
determination."' 6 Nonetheless, he concludes the following: "Greek and Roman law
afforded little protection to the unborn. If abortion was prosecuted in some places,
it seems to have been based on a concept of a violation of the father's right to his
offspring.'
ojProposalsfor a Human Life Amendment, 15 CAP. U. L. REV. 417,447(1986) ("The [Hatch-Eagleton
Amendment] is intended to preclude reliance upon any provision of the Constitution as authority for
recognition of [a right to abortion], whatever its alleged constitutional basis." (citations omitted)); Paolo
Torzilli, Note, Reconciling the Sanctity of Human Life, the Declaration of Independence, and the
Constitution, 40 CATH. LAW. 197, 224 25 (2000) (listing a constitutional amendment as one option to
"help preserve the right to life for the unborn"). For an outline of post-Roe efforts to pass a human life
amendment, see NAT'L COMM. FOR A HUMAN LIFE AMENDMENT, HUMAN LIFE AMENDMENT
HIGHLIGHTS: UNITED STATES CONGRESS (1973 2003) (2004), http://www.nchla.org/datasource/
idocuments/HLAhghlts.pdf.
11. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
12. Id. at 152; see also Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Fourteenth Amendment's Constitution, 69
S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 95 (1995) ("Roe exemplifies the interpretive distortions that result when the political
theoretic concepts of the Fourteenth Amendment become submerged beneath technical stratagems
arguably well suited to legal competence but askew from constitutional ideals.").
13. See JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, DISPELLING THE MYTHS OF ABORTION HISTORY 697 (2006)
(citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 118 n.2); Forsythe & Presser, supra note 3, at 94 ("As of January 1973, thirty-
one states permitted no exception other than to save the life of the mother, and most states actively
enforced their abortion laws.").
14. Roe, 410 U.S. at 116 17. The historical recitation in Roe has been characterized as
"sophomoric." See Richard A. Posner, Judges' Writing Style (andDo They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
1421, 1434-35 (1995).
15. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Abortion and the Law: Blackmun's Distortion of the Historical
Record, in ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION: REVERSING RO! v. WAI)l" THROUGH THE COURTS 137,
138 (Dennis J. Horan et al. eds., 1987) (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 129 52, 156 62); see also Robert F.
Nagel, Political Pressure and Judging in Constitutional Cases, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 685, 691 (1990)
("I count some twenty-three pages of [medical ethics and philosophy in the Roe opinion] before the
Constitution is again mentioned (and then only to concede that its text does not mention a right to
privacy)." (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 152)).
16. Roe, 410 U.S. at 130.
17. Id. It is impossible to reject the conclusion that "Roman law afforded little protection to the
unborn." Id. As has been noted by many scholars, Roman law allowed infanticide through the exposure
of unwanted infants. See, e.g., CHARLES J. REID JR., POWER OVER THE BODY, EQUALITY IN THE FAMILY:
RIGHTS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 70 (2004) ("Paternal power conferred
on the head of household the power of life and death (vitae necisque potestas) over those under his
authority.... The power of life and death was exerted in a different context as well the exposure by
[Vol. 59: 701
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Turning to the Hippocratic Oath, and relying almost exclusively upon a single
scholarly work," Justice Blackmun found that the Oath's prohibition of giving a
woman a pessary to produce abortion "represent[s] only a small segment of Greek
opinion [at that time] and that it certainly was not accepted by all ancient
physicians."' 9 In spite of his observations that the Oath "represents the apex of the
development of strict ethical concepts in medicine, and its influence endures to this
day,, 20 Justice Blackmun provided no analysis of the Oath's influence on
physicians throughout the Western world during medieval and modern times. This
omission is particularly striking in light of Justice Blackmun's apparent
determination to rebut the Oath in Roe.2'
After its analysis of the Hippocratic Oath, the majority opinion then recounted
what it represented as a history of the common law's treatment of abortion.22 While
citing multiple sources, Justice Blackmun's evidence, interpretation, and reasoning
closely follow the history of abortion as interpreted by the president and co-
founders of the National Association for Reform of Abortion Laws23-Lawrence
Lader24 and the organization's legal counsel Cyril Means, Jr.25 In this
parents of unwanted children, usually infants."). For a detailed account of abortion in ancient Rome and
Greece, see generally KONSTANTINOS KAPPARIS, ABORTION IN THE ANCIENT WORLD (2002).
18. In his opinion, Justice Blackmun appears to uncritically embrace the views expressed by
Professor Ludwig Edelstein in his monograph, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH (1943). See Roe, 410 U.S. at
130 32. This is a rather slender reed upon which to rest the conclusion that the Hippocratic Oath's
provisions on abortion were largely irrelevant to medical practice in ancient times. See Martin Arbagi,
Roe and the Hippocratic Oath, in ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION: REVERSING ROE V. WADE
THROUGH THE COURTS, supra note 15, at 159 (criticizing the Roe Court's reliance on Professor
Edelstein's interpretation of the Hippocratic Oath); John M. Dolan, Is Physician-Assisted Suicide
Possible?, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 355, 383 (1996) ("It is interesting to note that Edelstein's defective
translation is the one quoted by Blackmun in his Roe opinion. Even more significant is the fact that
Edelstein's unsound remarks about the status of the Oath are also quoted with respect by Blackmun.");
Lisa R. Hasday, The Hippocratic Oath as Literary Text: A Dialogue Between Law and Medicine, 2
YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 299, 306 12 (2002) (examining the Roe Court's discussion of the
Hippocratic Oath).
19. Roe, 410 U.S. at 132 (citing EDELSTEIN, supra note 18, at 63).
20. Id. at 131. As noted in Roe, not one of the principal briefs in the case mentioned the Oath. Id.
Moreover, counsel for the plaintiffs was not even prepared to address the Oath during oral argument.
See Nan D. Hunter, Justice Blacknun, Abortion, and the M/yth of Medical Independence, 72 BROOK.
L. REV. 147, 177-78 (2006).
21. Professor Gregory Sisk notes that Justice Blackmun subsequently seemed uninterested in
discussing any aspect of Roe other than his treatment ofthe Hippocratic Oath. See Gregory C. Sisk, The
Willful Judging of Harry Blacknun, 70 Mo. L. REv. 1049, 1055 (2005).
22. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 132-36.
23. The National Association for Reform of Abortion Laws was subsequently renamed the
National Abortion Rights Action League in 1973 and in 2003 adopted its current name NARAL Pro-
Choice America. NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, HISTORY OF NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA,
http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/assets/files/About-NARAL-history.pdf (last visited May 29, 2008).
24. Mr. Lader described his attempts to legalize abortion through "confrontation politics" as "a
crude, inflammatory approach, but the only way to shake the country." LAWRENCE LADER, ABORTION
II: MAKING THE REVOLUTION 16 (1973). Lader continued to be active in promoting abortion until his
death on May 7, 2006. See Patricia Sullivan, Lawrence Lader, 86; Crucial Voice ofAbortion Rights
Vanguard, WASH. POST, May 11, 2006, at B6.
25. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 13 at 13 18 (2006) (discussing Cyril Means's influence in
shaping what the Roe Court propounded as the history of abortion); Joseph W. Dellapenna, The History
of Abortion: Technology, Morality, and Law, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 359, 363-65 (1979) [hereinafter
Dellapenna, The History ofAbortion] (same).
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bowdlerized account of the common law, abortion was only a crime after
"quickening"-when the mother could feel movement by the unborn child-or
"animation"-when the unborn child was infused with a soul.26 In this account,
subsequent development of English law became more and more liberal as more was
learned about pregnancy. While English law originally classified abortion as a
felony,2 7 it subsequently rejected punishment of any doctor who performed an
abortion to prevent "a serious and permanent threat to the mother's health."28 When
even this restraint proved too restrictive, Parliament enacted the Abortion Act of
1967, which permits a physician "to terminate a pregnancy where he is of the good-
faith opinion that the abortion 'is immediately necessary to save the life or to
prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant
woman. " 2 9 Yet, a review of early English cases and authors such as Lord Bracton
and Sir Edward Coke (both of whom are cited by Justice Blackmun)" establishes
26. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 132-36 ("The significance of quickening was echoed by later common-
law scholars and found its way into the received common law in this country."). Scholars have roundly
criticized the Roe Court's discussion of the medieval treatment of abortion. See, e.g., DELLAPENNA,
supra note 13, at 126 ("[T]he Court largely got the history wrong, basing its views upon and
contributing to a new orthodoxy on abortion history that forms a set of myths that are coherent with
each other but are utterly false to the historical record as it has come down to us."); Bryn, supra note
3, at 814-39 (summarizing the historical errors found in the Roe opinion); John R. Connery, The
Ancients and the Medievals on Abortion: The Consensus the Court Ignored, in ABORTION AND THE
CONSTITUTION: REVERSING ROl V. WI)I" THROUGH THE COURTS, supra note 15, at 123 ("The Court's
version of history is so defective that it serves no useful purpose and the accurate account, far from
validating the position of the Court, offers a very convincing argument against it.").
27. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 136-37.
28. See id. at 137 (citing Rex v. Bourne, [1939] 1 K.B. 687). This was the product of a ruling in
Rex v. Bourne, [1939] 1 K.B. 687, which involved the prosecution of a doctor who aborted a teen's
pregnancy that had resulted from gang rape. See id. One commentator noted the following regarding
Bourne's impact on the law governing abortion:
Even though the ruling from the bench in Bourne's favor was merely ajury
instruction at an Old Bailey trial, the case received wide publicity and the decision
was widely cited as settling the matter in England and elsewhere in the Empire.
The Bourne case was even followed by at least one court in the United States. The
result in Bourne considerably liberalized the interpretation of England's abortion
statute, even beyond the reforms proposed to Parliament and not enacted. While
Bourne made prosecutions for abortion more difficult, the decision was
sufficiently narrow that physicians would still need to worry about the possibility
of a prosecution if they performed an abortion in less sympathetic circumstances.
The luck of the draw in impaneling a jury would determine whether they were
convicted. This concern could deter abortions by many physicians even if they
were personally supportive of a liberalized approach to abortion.
DELLAPENNA, supra note 13, at 531 (footnotes omitted).
29. Roe, 410 U.S. at 138 (quoting Abortion Act of 1967, 15 & 16 Eliz. 2, c. 87, § 1(4)).
Notwithstanding the liberality of English law under Bourne, the "mental health" exception became the
primary justification for abortion. One commentator has noted,
Nearly all legal abortions in England and Wales after 1967 were justified by
risks to the mental health or the social situation of the woman. In 1990, nearly all
abortions performed [on] English and Welsh women (98.4 percent) were justified
by social indications, with even more of the abortions of foreign women (99.85
percent) being justified by social indications .... Because genuine risks to a
woman's physical health are extremely rare, such threats hardly appear in the
records of abortions in England.
DELLAPENNA, supra note 13, at 582 (footnotes omitted).
30. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 134 36 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 59: 701
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that "killing a child in the womb of its mother" was always considered a crime.3
However, proving the commission of such a crime, especially before the woman
had felt the child move, was enormously difficult in light of then-existing medical
knowledge.32
The historical license taken by Justice Blackmun in his description of the
English common and statutory law is trivial, however, when compared with the
selective treatment American law received in Roe's historical account of abortion.33
Justice Blackmun summarized the American history as follows:
It is thus apparent that at common law, at the time of the
adoption of our Constitution, and throughout the major portion of
the 19th century, abortion was viewed with less disfavor than
under most American statutes currently in effect. Phrasing it
another way, a woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to
terminate a pregnancy than she does in most States today. At least
with respect to the early stage of pregnancy, and very possibly
without such a limitation, the opportunity to make this choice was
present in this country well into the 19th century. Even later, the
law continued for some time to treat less punitively an abortion
procured in early pregnancy.34
A comprehensive review of the history of American abortion law reveals the exact
opposite-American law followed English precedent in punishing abortion as a
crime, but only when the state could prove that the woman was pregnant at the time
of the alleged criminal act. American and early-English law consistently treated
abortion with strong disfavor: "The tradition of treating abortion as a crime was
unbroken through nearly 800 years of English and American history until the
reform movement of the later twentieth century."35 However, an equally strong
31. Cyril C. Means, Jr., The Phoenix ofAbortionalFreedom: Is a Penumbral or Ninth-Amendment
Right A bout to Arise from the Nineteenth-Century Legislative Ashes of a Fourteenth-Century Common-
Law Liberty2 , 17 N.Y.L.F. 335, 339 (1971) (reporting a translation of Y.B. Mich. 22 Edw. 3 (1348),
which Professor Means refers to as "The Abortionist's Case").
32. See Bryn, supra note 3, at 816-27 (providing examples of common law abortion prosecutions
that exemplify the difficulty in proving the requisite criminal act); Clarke D. Forsythe, The Effective
Enforcement of Abortion Law Before Roe v. Wade, in THE SILENT SUBJECT: REFLECTIONS ON THE
UNBORN INAMERICAN CULTURE 179, 183 (Brad Stetson ed., 1996) ("[T]he American colonies imported
the English common law against abortion and enforced it, to the extent possible given primitive medical
science."); Gregory J. Roden, Roe v. Wade and the Common Law: Denying the Blessings ofLiberty to
Our Posterity, 35 UWLA L. REV. 212, 219-40 (2003) (same).
3 3. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 138 41.
34. Roe, 410 U.S. at 140-41.
35. DELLAPENNA, supra note 13, at xii (internal quotation marks omitted); see also JOHN KEOWN,
ABORTION, DOCTORS AND THE LAW (1988) (analyzing abortion regulation from 1200 to 1988); MARVIN
OLASKY, ABORTION RITES: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF ABORTION IN AMERICA (Regnery Publ'g, Inc. 1995)
(providing a detailed history of abortion in America); Dellapenna, The History ofAbortion, supra note
25, at 365-416 (examining the "Four Phases of the Law Governing Abortion in Anglo-American
Law"); Forsythe, supra note 32, at 183 ("[T]he American colonies imported the English common law
against abortion and enforced it, to the extent possible given primitive medical science. Common law
abortion cases have been discovered in a number of American colonies."); James S. Witherspoon,
Reexamining Roe: Nineteenth-Century Abortion Statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment, 17 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 29 (1985) (examining American abortion laws in effect during the 1800s).
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Anglo-American tradition required a strong factual basis for the conclusion that an
abortion had been committed before imposing criminal penalties. 6
In short, Roe's historical account of American abortion regulation
mischaracterizes prosecutors' proper reluctance to pursue cases without adequate
evidence of pregnancy as a recognition of a woman's right to terminate a
pregnancy. The magnitude of this misreading of history suggests Justice Blackmun
confused the role of a dispassionate jurist with that of a partisan advocate of
abortion.37
B. Roe's Claim of Implicit Unconstitutionality
Ultimately, Justice Blackmun grounded the right to abortion in prior judicial
interpretations of the Constitution that recognized a right to privacy. 8 Equating
interpretations of explicit constitutional provisions that protect the privacy of the
36. See Bryn, supra note 3, at 817 25; Dellapenna, The History ofAbortion, supra note 25, at
369-71.
37. A review of Justice Blackmun's papers suggests that his personal commitment to abortion
rights increased during his tenure on the Court.
Based on my work in the Blackmun papers, I have suggested that his post-I 973
development was an example of path dependence: that being vilified by one side
of the abortion debate and lionized by the other in the aftermath of Roe v. Wade
led him to become more and more entrenched in his defense of Roe. As a result,
he eventually came to embrace a unified jurisprudence of women's rights and
abortion rights that was almost completely foreign to the medical model of
abortion with which he began. Blackmun was a brooder who took things
personally. It is hard to imagine Justice William Brennan sitting in his chambers
at night reading through the tens of thousands of pieces of hate mail that poured
into the Blackmun chambers. Blackmun read all those letters and saved them all;
in their way, they helped make him the Justice he became.
Linda Greenhouse, Justices Who Change: A Response to Epstein et al., 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1885,
1886-87 (2007) (footnotes omitted). Another commentator noted,
With the release of Justice Blackmun's personal papers, we have learned
more about how Roe proceeded in a straight line from his previous personal
opinions about abortion, about how he appealed to and perceived other members
of the Court through the lens of his political stance on the controversial question,
and about how Roe radicalized a previously moderate jurist into a willful judge
ready and willing to impose his view of the preferred answer to controversial
political, social, and moral questions into a constitutional mandate.
Sisk, supra note 21, at 1055-56. Justice Blackmun described his reaction to the letters of citizens
regarding his opinion in Roe during an interviewwith Professor Harold Koh. Blacknun Reflects on 'Roe
v. Wade,'(National Public Radio broadcast Mar. 5, 2004), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/
dmg/dmg.php?mediaURL-/atc/20040305 atc blackmunroefinal&NPRMediaPref-WM. For a
discussion of how the series of interviews with Justice Blackmun came about, see generally Harold
Hongju Koh, Unveiling Justice Blacknun, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 9 (2006).
38. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 53.
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home and of criminal defendants39 to the judicially-created right to use and sell
contraception,40 the Roe majority found the following:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined,
in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not
to terminate her pregnancy.4'
As one prominent scholar of constitutional law has observed, "Roe simply
stringcites a series of privacy cases involving marriage, procreation, contraception,
bedroom reading, education, and other assorted topics, and then abruptly announces
with no doctrinal analysis that this privacy right 'is broad enough to encompass'
abortion. Ipse dixit."42 The Court's inability to definitively identify the
constitutional text or historical interpretation that required the overturning of forty-
six states' abortion laws43 evidences the vacuous nature of Roe's analysis.
The Court rejected any claim of constitutional status on behalf of the unborn
child as unsupported by the text of the Constitution.44 According to Justice
39. In the 1960s, the Supreme Court gave the term privacy a central role in the interpretation of
the Third and Fourth Amendments. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8 9 (1968) (stating that the
Fourth Amendment protects areas in which one has a reasonable expectation of privacy from
unreasonable searches and seizures); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.5 (1967) ("The Third
Amendment's prohibition against the unconsented peacetime quartering of soldiers protects another
aspect of privacy from governmental intrusion.").
40. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,452 55 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
484-86 (1965).
41. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
42. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 778 (1999) (footnote omitted)
(quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 153).
43. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 13, at 697.
44. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 156-57. The majority correctly identified the Constitution as addressing
the rights of "citizens" or "persons," but limited those terms to human beings who survive birth. See id.
at 157. Specifically, the Court noted,
The Constitution does not define "person" in so many words. Section I of
the Fourteenth Amendment contains three references to "person." The first, in
defining "citizens," speaks of "persons born or naturalized in the United States."
The word also appears both in the Due Process Clause and in the Equal Protection
Clause. "Person" is used in other places in the Constitution: in the listing of
qualifications for Representatives and Senators, Art. 1, § 2, cl. 2, and § 3, cl. 3; in
the Apportionment Clause, Art. I, § 2, cl. 3; in the Migration and Importation
provision, Art. I, § 9, cl. 1; in the Emolument Clause, Art. I, § 9, cl. 8; in the
Electors provisions, Art. 11, § 1, cl. 2, and the superseded cl. 3; in the provision
outlining qualifications for the office of President, Art. 11, § 1, cl. 5: in the
Extradition provisions, Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, and the superseded Fugitive Slave
Clause 3; and in the Fifth, Twelfth, and Twenty-second Amendments, as well as
in §§ 2 and 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. But in nearly all these instances, the
use of the word is such that it has application only postnatally. None indicates,
with any assurance, that it has any possible pre-natal application.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 157 (footnotes omitted).
The Court has yet to explain how human beings within the womb fail to qualify as "persons" under
the terms of the Constitution, while corporations and other artificial legal beings are constitutional
"persons" for certain purposes. See, e.g., Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490, 495 97 (1927)
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Blackmun, the Court's differing treatment of constitutional text is justified because
no prior case had held "that a fetus is a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 45 The majority further opined that a contrary ruling would be
inconsistent with the Texas law at issue in Roe, which allowed abortion for the
purpose of saving the life of the mother.46
Careful examination of the development of Anglo-American law prior to Roe
evidences increasing attempts to protect the life of the unborn child, which resulted
from advancing medical knowledge about the nature of pregnancy and the
characteristics of the unborn child . 7 Unlike their eighteenth-century counterparts,
doctors and scientists in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had sufficient
scientific facts about pregnancy to conclude that the unborn child was a separate
human being from the time of conception, and therefore worthy of legal
protection.4" The absence of an eighteenth-century case holding that the unborn
child was a "constitutional person" is not surprising in light of the medical
knowledge in existence at that time. The Court's reliance upon this absence is as
foolish as a conclusion that the absence of a case holding that the Internet is a
means of human communication removes the Internet from the free speech
protections of the First Amendment.4 9
As for any possible inconsistency with the Texas law, it is difficult to predict
what the Court's view would have been had it taken seriously Texas's claim of
competing constitutional interests, notwithstanding Justice Blackmun's cavalier
dismissal: "But if the fetus is a person who is not to be deprived of life without due
process of law, and if the mother's condition is the sole determinant, does not the
Texas exception appear to be out of line with the Amendment's command? '5° The
constitutionality of a state'sfailure to protect the life of the unborn was not before
the Court in Roe, and was unlikely to have arisen under the Texas statute at issue
in the case.
If such a case had been presented to the Court in the early 1970s, it likely
would have come from a court in Alaska, Hawaii, New York, or Washington,
because these jurisdictions had eliminated virtually all restrictions on abortion
(holding that a corporation is a constitutional person for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause).
Professor Charles 1. Lugosi explores this judicial deficiency in his article, Conforming to the Rule of
Law: When Person and Human Being Finally Mean the Same Thing in Fourteenth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 22 ISSUEs L. & MED. 119 (2007). One suspects that finding that the unborn child is a
constitutional person would not have been difficult if the Court had employed the same level of
creativity and ingenuity it showed in finding a right to abortion in the liberty clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, see Roe, 410 U.S. at 153, or the right to prescribe and use contraception emanating from
the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, see Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 86.
45. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157.
46. Id. at 157, n.54.
47. See Bryn, supra note 3, at 825-26.
48. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 13, at 257 61, 281 84 (discussing early attempts at legal
protection of the unborn); Witherspoon, supra note 35, at 40 50,61 69 (same). For an analysis ofhow
contemporary medical discoveries regarding pregnancy and abortion may impact abortion
jurisprudence, see generally Jason A. Adkins, Note, Meet Me at the (West Coast) Hotel: The Lochner
Era and the Demise of Roe v. Wade, 90 MINN. L. REV. 500 (2005).
49. Cf Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (holding that free speech protections limited
Federal Communications Decency Act provisions that sought to protect minors from harmful material
on the Internet).
50. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158, n.54.
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during the first half of pregnancy.5' It is possible that an unborn child through the
father or other next friend-might have sought an injunction to stop the mother
from obtaining an abortion, arguing that the state had a constitutional obligation to
protect the child's life. 2 A court might have rejected such a claim by finding a lack
of any state action 53 or by adopting a narrow procedural interpretation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 4. 5 A court might have answered any
claim that the Equal Protection Clause was violated by omitting the unborn from
laws protecting the life of infants and other born persons by denying that unborn
children and born children are similarly situated due to the unborn child's physical
location within the mother's body.5 Orjust maybe the Court would have found that
the vulnerability of the unborn and the infant are sufficiently similar to require
equal protection of both at least in cases when the abortion is not necessary to
protect the life of the mother 6 and ordered that the injunction issue.
111. EXPANSION OF ROE'S FLAWED REASONING
In the nineteen years between the creation of a constitutional right to abortion
in Roe v. Wade57 and the reaffirmation of its constitutional status in Planned
51. See Act of Apr. 30, 1970, ch. 103, 1970 Alaska Sess. Laws (codified as amended at ALASKA
STAT. §§ 18.16.010-.090 (2006)): Act of Mar. 11, 1970, ch. 1, § 2, 1970 Haw. Sess. Laws I (codified
at HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453-16 (LexisNexis 2005)); Act of Apr. 11, 1970, ch. 127, 1960 N.Y. Sess.
Laws 170 (codified at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05(3) (McKinney 2004)); Act of Feb. 9, 1970, ch. 3,
1970 Wash. Sess. Laws 23 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.02.100-.170 (West
2003)). For a comprehensive history of state abortion statutes enacted between 1967 and 1973, see
generally Paul Benjamin Linton, Enforcement of State Abortion Statutes After Roe: A State-by-State
Analysis, 67 U. DET. L. REV. 157 (1990).
52. See, e.g., Byrn v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 286 N.E.2d 887, 890 (N.Y. 1972) (finding
nonjusticiable the issue of whether an unborn child qualifies for legal personhood), appeal dismissed,
410 U.S. 949 (1973). Whether the Court would ever recognize the constitutional personhood of the
unborn is the subject of a debate between Professor Nathan Schlueter and Judge Robert H. Bork in
Constitutional Persons: An Exchange on Abortion, FIRST THINGS, Jan. 2003, at 28, available at
http://www.firstthings.com/article.php3?id article-424.
53. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't ofSoc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,201 03 (1989)
(rejecting liability arising under the Constitution for government officials' failure to protect children,
even in cases where officials have notice that the children's lives are threatened).
54. See, e.g., Conn. Dep't of Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (finding that a Connecticut law
did not violate procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment).
55. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 773-83 (Iowa 2003) (denying custody
to genetic and intended mother ofembryos for implantation, absent ex-husband's consent); A.Z. v. B.Z.,
725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000) (same); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998) (same); Roman v.
Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App. 2006) (same); cf Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67,
85-86 (2001) (holding that state hospital urine testing ofpregnant patients to obtain evidence ofcocaine
use was an unreasonable search absent the patients' consent, even if the ultimate goal was to get
pregnant women off drugs and into treatment).
56. See Teresa Collett, The Courts 'Confused (and Confusing) Understanding of the Creation and
Taking of Human Life, 68 MONT. L. REV. 265, 279 82 (2007) (discussing the law governing the killing
ofnonaggressors in order to preserve life): cf Miller v. HCA, Inc., 118 S.W.3d 758, 772 (Tex. 2003)
(rejecting a battery claim by the parents of a prematurely born infant due to the hospital's life-sustaining
efforts); Stewart-Graves v. Vaughn, 170 P.3d 1151, 1163 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) (rejecting the parents'
claim of medical malpractice due to the successful resuscitative medical treatment of an infant who was
born without a heartbeat but survived with severe and permanent disabilities).
57. 410 U.S. 113, 153 54 (1973).
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Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,58 the Court issued opinions
regarding abortion at least twenty times.5 9 This is largely due to the legislative-as
opposed to judicial-nature of the majority's opinion in Roe,6" and the public's
resistance to the seemingly unlimited nature of the abortion right that emerged from
the Court's definition of "health" in Doe v. Bolton.6
Numerous other commentators have described the remarkable performance of
the Court as what various Justices have characterized as the "Nation's ex officio
medical board."62 This description stems from the Court striking down laws that
58. 505 U.S. 833, 845 46 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
59. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S.
502 (1990); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S.
490 (1989); Thomburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); Diamond
v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986); Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983); Planned Parenthood
Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Williams v. Zbaraz,
448 U.S. 358 (1980); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979);
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Poelkerv. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Singleton v.
Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
During the confirmation hearings ofJustices Alito and Roberts, Senator Arlen Specter claimed that
the Court had thirty-eight occasions to overrule Roe. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of
Samuel A. A lito, Jr. to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 321 (2006) [hereinafter Alito Confirmation Hearing]
(statement of Sen. Arlen Specter, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); Roberts Confirmation
Hearing, supra note 1, 109th Cong. 145 (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter, Chairman, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary). Our numbers differ due to additional cases between 1992-the year Casey was
decided and 2005-the year of the hearings regarding Chief Justice Roberts and in part because of
my exclusion of cases declined by the Court.
60. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]he conscious weighing of competing
factors that the Court's opinion apparently substitutes for the established test is far more appropriate to
a legislative judgment than to ajudicial one.").
61. See 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973). Specifically, the Doe Court noted the following: "We
agree ... that the medical judgment may be exercised in the light of all factors-physical, emotional,
psychological, familial, and the woman's age-relevant to the well-being of the patient. All these
factors may relate to health." Id. The effect of this broad language is evidenced by a statement of Dr.
Warren Hem of Colorado, the author of a textbook on abortion procedures: "I will certify that any
pregnancy is a threat to a woman's life and could cause grievous injury to her physical health." Ruth
Padawer, Clinton May Back Abortion Measure; Seeks Middle Ground on Partial Birth Ban, RECORD
(Bergen County, N.J.), May 14, 1997, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. See Forsythe & Presser, supra note 3, at 87 & n.2 (quoting City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 456
(O'Connor, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary
ConstitutionalRulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 847, 918 n.371 (2005) (citing Danforth, 428 U.S. at 99 (1976)
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)); Richard A. Cordray & James T. Vradelis,
Comment, The Emerging Jurisprudence of Justice O'Connor, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 389, 400 (1985)
(citing City ofAkron, 462 U.S. at 456 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)). The first reference to the Court as the
"ex officio medical board" came in Justice White's separate opinion in Danforth. See 428 U.S. at 99
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice White noted,
[T]he evidence discloses that the result [of the Missouri Act at issue] is a desirable
one or at least that the legislature could have so viewed it. That should end our
inquiry, unless we purport to be not only the country's continuous constitutional
convention but also its ex officio medical board with powers to approve or
disapprove medical and operative practices and standards throughout the United
States.
Id. Seven years later, in City ofAkron, Justice O'Connor restated Justice White's earlier expression with
the addition of the word "Nation." See 462 U.S. at 456 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Danforth,
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required parental consent prior to performance of an abortion on a minor;63
overturning state requirements that a second physician be present during a
postviability abortion to provide immediate medical care for any child surviving the
abortion;64  and invalidating bans on abortion by saline amniocentesis,
notwithstanding clear evidence that safer methods of abortion were available.6"
However, a detailed review of all of the Court's abortion cases is not required to
establish the point at which the Court erected an ambitious regulatory scheme on
the faulty foundation of Roe; examination of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey66 and Stenberg v. Carhart67 will suffice.
A. The Hubris of Casey
Notwithstanding the Court's increasing demands that states end their attempts
to legislate on the issue of abortion, state legislatures throughout the country
continued to pass various abortion-related laws. Among these legislatures was
Pennsylvania, which passed one of the most comprehensive abortion laws in the
country in 1982.68 The Pennsylvania law required that an abortion facility provide
a woman with specific types of information prior to obtaining her consent to an
abortion and that the facility observe a twenty-four hour waiting period prior to
performance of the abortion;6 9 that a parent consent prior to the performance of an
abortion on a minor;7" that a married woman acknowledge that she had notified her
husband prior to obtaining an abortion;7' and that abortion providers report various
information, including the type of procedure performed, the duration of gestation
prior to the abortion, and the existence and nature of complications.72 When
abortion providers challenged the constitutionality of the law, the state of
Pennsylvania vigorously defended the law in every court, including the Supreme
Court of the United States.73
After the Court's decision to uphold the Missouri abortion law at issue in
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,74 many in the pro-life movement were
cautiously optimistic that the Pennsylvania law would provide the vehicle for
overturning Roe.75 And in fact, they had good cause to be optimistic if the history
428 U.S. at 99 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Summing up the future impact of
the majority opinion in City ofAkron, Justice O'Connor stated, "As today's decision indicates, medical
technology is changing, and this change will necessitate our continued functioning as the Nation's 'ex
officio medical board .... ' Id.
63. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74-75 (majority opinion).
64. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 769-71.
65. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75 79.
66. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
67. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
68. See Abortion Control Act of1982, 1982 Pa. Laws 476, Act No. 138 (codified as amended atl 8
PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3201 20 (2000)).
69. Casey, 505 U.S. at 844 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205 (1990)).
70. Id. (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3206).
71. Id. (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3209).
72. See id. (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3207, 3214).
73. See id. at 845.
74. 492 U.S. 490, 522 (1989).
75. See Ramesh Ponnum, Abortion Now: Thirty Years After Roe, a Daunting Landscape, 55
NAT'L REV. 37, 37 (2003).
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of the Casey opinion provided in Justice Blackmun's papers is accurate. 76 Justice
Kennedy was initially prepared to provide the fifth vote to overrule Roe and return
the issue of abortion to the people and their elected representatives, but Justice
Kennedy was eventually persuaded to retain a judicial construction of the
Constitution protecting the right of a woman to choose abortion,77 which the Casey
plurality characterized as the "essential holding of Roe."78
In what at least one legal scholar has characterized as the worst Supreme Court
decision ever,7 9 a majority of the Court upheld all provisions of the Pennsylvania
statute except the requirement of husband notification.80 Four of the Justices were
prepared to overrule Roe;8 two were adamant that Roe be retained;82 and three were
persuaded that the institutional integrity of the Court required continued protection
of the practice." With opinions on the Court so divided, the joint opinion of
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter became the controlling rule of law. In the
opinion, these Justices do not affirm the correctness of Roe, nor do they declare that
any interpretation of the Constitution's text limits the ability of states to protect
unborn human life. Rather, they sidestep these issues, instead declaring that "the
immediate question is not the soundness of Roe's resolution of the issue, but the
precedential force that must be accorded to its holding."84
Supporters and opponents of abortion rights have criticized the plurality
opinion as unprincipled. 5 Perhaps the passage receiving the most negative attention
76. See Linda Greenhouse, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN 203-06 (2005).
77. See id.
78. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
79. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision ofAll Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 995, 1001 (2003).
80. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 879.
81. Id. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Speaking for Justices
White, Scalia, and Thomas, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, "We believe that Roe was wrongly decided,
and that it can and should be overruled consistently with our traditional approach to stare decisis in
constitutional cases." Id.
82. Id. at 914 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("My disagreement with the
joint opinion begins with its understanding of the trimester framework established in Roe. Contrary to
the suggestion of the joint opinion, it is not a contradiction to recognize that the State may have a
legitimate interest in potential human life and, at the same time, to conclude that the interest does not
justify the regulation of abortion before viability .. ." (internal citation and quotation marks omitted))-
id. at 934 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part)
("Roe's requirement of strict scrutiny as implemented through a trimester framework should not be
disturbed.").
83. See id at 845-46 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, JJ.) ("After considering the
fundamental constitutional questions resolved by Roe, principles of institutional integrity, and the rule
of stare decisis, we are led to conclude this: the essential holding ofRoe v. Wade should be retained and
once again reaffirmed.").
84. Id. at 871.
85. See e.g., Janet Benshoof, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Impact of the New Undue Burden
Standard on Reproductive Health Care, 269 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 2249, 2253 (1993) ("In distinguishing
women's liberty to choose whetherto continue apregnancy from other 'fundamental' choices like those
involving religion, speech, and marriage, the Court has made distinctions that are not justified in other
areas of constitutional law, singling out one medical procedure and one personal choice."); Steven G.
Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and the Constitution: Some Originalist and Normative Arguments for
Overruling Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 311,
336-46 (2005) (noting the flaws in the Court's reasoning behind the decision not to overrule Roe);
Kathryn Kolbert & David H. Gans, Responding to Planned Parenthood v. Casey: Establishing
Neutrality Principles in State ConstitutionalLaw, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1151, 1151-54 (1993) (arguing that
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is the plurality's extravagant statement of the j udicially-created right to decisional
privacy:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under compulsion of the State. 86
This "sweet-mystery-of-life passage"8 has been derided by legal commentators,88
who have characterized it as "popular mythology, ' ' 8o "an embarrassment and object
the joint opinion in Casey based its holding more on the integrity of the Court than on any sound legal
reasoning).
86. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). Based on this
statement, the Court invalidated the Pennsylvania requirement that a married woman acknowledge that
she had notified her husband of her intention to obtain an abortion, id at 898, absent the woman
providing the physician a written statement that (1) her spouse is not the father of the child (2) after
diligent effort, she could not locate her spouse; (3) "the pregnancy is the result of spousal sexual assault
which she has reported" to law enforcement; or (4) she has reason to believe that notifying her spouse
is likely to result in the infliction of bodily injury upon her by her spouse or by another individual. Id.
at 887.
87. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 588 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88. E.g., Gerard V. Bradley, Shall We Ratify the New Constitution": The Judicial Manifesto in
Casey and Lee, in BENCHMARKS: GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE SUPREME COURT
117, 120-25 (Terry Eastland ed., 1995) (characterizing the mystery-of-life passage from Casey as
creating a"Megaright"); John M. Breen & Michael A. Scaperlanda, Never Get Out 'a the Boat: Stenberg
v. Carhart and the Future of American Law, 39 CONN. L. REv. 297, 312 (2006) ("The Court is able to
ignore this violence because, in the case of abortion, it has abandoned the idea of ordered liberty in
favor of a maximal conception of human freedom."); Patrick McKinley Brennan, Against Sovereignty:
A Cautionary Note on the Normative Power of the Actual, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 181, 191 (2006)
("It is the same Supreme Court that in one breath, per Justice Kennedy in a breathtaking bit of anti-
metaphysics, identifies the 'heart of liberty [as] the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life,' that, in a next breath, per the same Justice
Kennedy, makes metaphysical claims that would delight the medieval mind." (alteration in original)
(quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851)); Bradley P. Jacob, Back to Basics: Constitutional Meaning and
"Tradition," 39 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 261, 275 (2007) ("Other constitutional rights in the popular
mythology are not found anywhere in the Constitution itself, but the misperception is certainly
understandable because the United States Supreme Court has declared that people have a constitutional
right to privacy, to abortion, to homosexual sodomy, and even to 'define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."' (quoting Casey, 505 U.S.
at 851)).
89. Jacob, supra note 88, at 275.
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of derision," 90 "startling,"'I "radical," 92 and representing "the view that moral
relativism is a constitutional command.,
93
The mystery-of-life passage has also formed the basis of a variety of claims by
plaintiffs seeking to broaden the scope of constitutionally protected conduct. The
New Jersey Supreme Court quoted the passage as part of its rationale for striking
down a statutory requirement of parental notification prior to the performance of
an abortion on a minor.94 The passage has become almost an obligatory citation in
the briefs of activists asserting a constitutional claim to recognition of same-sex
unions as marriages.95 In Fleck & Associates, Inc. v. City of Phoenix,96 the plaintiff
argued that the mystery-of-life passage encompasses a right to operate a business
where adults can view or participate in live sex acts.97 In another case, an adult
bookstore employee relied upon the passage 98 to challenge the constitutionality of
a Texas criminal prohibition of promoting an "obscene device." 99 A group of law
school faculty members claimed that the Casey language created a right to
"educational autonomy."' 100 The plaintiffs in Burt v. Rumsfeld argued that this
alleged right permitted colleges to disregard the Solomon Amendment'0' a federal
law prohibiting the exclusion of military recruiters from campuses receiving federal
funds. 1
02
Perhaps the most creative use of the mystery-of-life passage has been by an ex-
husband who argued that his "concept of the universe" did not include the payment
of court-ordered alimony. 0 3 That federal district court was unimpressed, declaring
that any conflict between the judicial order and the man's concept of existence was




90. Lino A. Graglia, Lawrence v. Texas: Our Philosopher-Kings Adopt Libertarianism as Our
Official National Philosophy and Reject Traditional Morality as a Basis for Law, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1139,
1139 (2004).
91. See Francis George, Law and Culture in the United States, 48 AM. J. JuRIs. 131, 145 (2003).
92. See G. Robert Blakey & Brian J. Murray, Threats, Free Speech, and the Jurisprudence of the
Federal Criminal Law, 2002 BYU L. REV. 829, 877 n. 130.
93. See Richard S. Myers, Same-Sex "'Marriage" and the Public Policy Doctrine, 32 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 45, 64 (1998).
94. Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620, 622 (N.J. 2000) (quoting Planned
Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992); see also Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren,
940 P.2d 797, 813, 831 (Cal. 1997) (citing to Casey and California precedent to find that a statute
requiring parental consent prior to performance of an abortion on a minor violated the California
constitution).
95. E.g., Appellants' Brief at 9-10, Smelt v. County of Orange, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006) (No.
05-56040), 2005 WL 3227255 (noting the mystery-of-life language from Casey); Brief for Amicus
Curiae in Support ofAppellants at 5 & n. 1, Hemandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d I (N.Y. 2006) (No. 6598),
2006 WL 1930145 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
96. 471 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2006).
97. See id. at 1104 05.
98. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16 17, Acosta v. Texas, cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 129 (2006)
(mem.) (No. 05-1574), 2006 WL 1594037 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
99. See id. at 22-24.
100. See Burt v. Rumsfeld, 354 F. Supp. 2d 156, 159, 189 (D. Conn. 2005).
101. See id.
102. 10 U.S.C. § 983 (2000).
103. See Martyak v. Martyak, 378 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1368 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
104. See id. at 1368 & n.1.
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The Court has subsequently attempted to limit the reach of the mystery-of-life
passage in Washington v. Glucksberg, '5 rejecting the claim of a constitutional right
to physician-assisted suicide.'16 Yet the language reemerged as a constitutional
justification for finding all criminal prohibitions of sodomy unconstitutional in
Lawrence v. Texas.'
0 7
Yet, even more troubling than the plurality's awkward philosophizing is its
demand that the American people submit to its judgment regarding abortion. The
joint opinion noted,
Where, in the performance of itsjudicial duties, the Court decides
a case in such a way as to resolve the sort of intensely divisive
controversy reflected in Roe and those rare, comparable cases, its
decision has a dimension that the resolution of the normal case
does not carry. It is the dimension present whenever the Court's
interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a
national controversy to end their national division by accepting a
common mandate rooted in the Constitution.0 8
The contending sides might have more respect for the Court's mandate if the Court
could definitively identify the text of the Constitution that compelled its decision.
Absent such identification, there seems littlej ustification for accepting the Justices'
political judgment as superior to that of other citizens.
The Casey plurality opinion also seems to suggest that any hope ofthe citizenry
that the Court would return abortion to the political process decreases in direct
proportion to public criticism of the Court's usurpation of the issue: "[T]o overrule
under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed
decision would subvert the Court's legitimacy beyond any serious question.' 11 9 As
Chief Justice Rehnquist notes in his critique of the plurality, "when the Court has
ruled on a divisive issue, it is apparently prevented from overruling that decision
for the sole reason that it was incorrect, unless opposition to the original decision
has died away."' 10
Justice Scalia was even sharper in his criticism:
The Imperial Judiciary lives. It is instructive to compare this
Nietzschean vision of us unelected, life-tenured judges-leading
a Volk who will be "tested by following," and whose very "belief
in themselves" is mystically bound up in their "understanding" of
a Court that "speak[s] before all others for their constitutional
105. 521 U.S. 702, 726 28 (1997) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
106. Id.
107. See 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
108. Casey, 505 U.S. at 866 67 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, JJ.).
109. Id. at 867.
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ideals" with the somewhat more modest role envisioned for
these lawyers by the Founders."'
Justice Scalia then quotes the Federalist Papers as establishing a less exalted
understanding of the role of the judiciary.'
12
Complaints of overreaching by judges have a long a history in our nation.
Thomas Jefferson was one of the early critics of the Supreme Court:
[T]he judiciary bodies were supposed to be the most helpless and
harmless members ofthe government. Experience, however, soon
showed in what way they were to become the most dangerous;
that the insufficiency of the means provided for their removal
gave them a freehold and irresponsibility in office; that their
decisions, seeming to concern individual suitors only, pass silent
and unheeded by the public at large; that these decisions,
nevertheless, become law by precedent, sapping, by little and
little, the foundations of the constitution, and working its change
by construction, before any one has perceived that that invisible
and helpless worm has been busily employed in consuming its
substance. 113
Abraham Lincoln expressed similar dissatisfaction in his first inaugural address:
"[J]f the policy of the government upon vital questions affecting the whole people
is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court .... the people will
have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their
government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.""'4
The Casey plurality's abstract reasoning and complete disregard ofthe primacy
of the democratic process in resolving difficult communal questions led some
public figures to publicly question whether the American people remain in control
of the Nation's collective destiny. Introducing a symposium published in the book
The End of Democracy?. The Judicial Usurpation of Politics, the editors of the
journal First Things wrote the following:
This symposium addresses many similarly troubling judicial
actions that add up to an entrenched pattern of government by
judges that is nothing less than the usurpation of politics. The
question here explored, in full awareness of its far-reaching
consequences, is whether we have reached or are reaching the
111. Id. at 996 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Casey, 505 U.S. at 868 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.)).
112. See id. ("The judiciary ... has.., no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the
society, and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither Force nor Will,
but merely judgment .... (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 393-94 (Alexander Hamilton) (G.
Willis ed., 1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
113. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Monsieur A. Coray (Oct. 31, 1823), in THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 480, 487 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907).
114. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in THE INAUGURAL ADDRESSES
OF THE PRESIDENTS 187, 194 (John Gabriel Hunt ed., Gramercy Books 1997).
[Vol. 59: 701
18
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 4 [2008], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol59/iss4/4
JUDICIAL MODESTY AND ABORTION
point where conscientious citizens can no longer give moral
assent to the existing regime. 15
In commenting on Casey and other opinions from the same judicial term, Judge
Robert Bork observed, "This last term of the Supreme Court brought home to us
with fresh clarity what it means to be ruled by an oligarchy. The most important
moral, political, and cultural decisions affecting our lives are steadily being
removed from democratic control."" 6 Professor Robert George joined Judge Bork
in questioning the effect of Casey on the American political system:
To say that the worst abuses of human rights have come from
the least democratic branch of government the judiciary is
true, but of increasingly questionable relevance to the crisis of
democratic legitimacy brought on by judicial action in the cause
of abortion and euthanasia. In practice, the American scheme of
constitutional democracy invests the courts with ultimate
authority to decide what the Constitution is to mean. Judicial
action and appointments can, and sometimes do, become major
issues in national elections. The refusal of the courts over more
than twenty-three years to reverse Roe v. Wade must, then, be
accounted a failure of American democracy." 7
All of these concerns were expressed prior to the Court's rejection of the laws of
thirty-one states on the basis of one physician's testimony and supporting experts'
speculation.'8
B. Indifference to Evidence in Stenberg v. Carhart
If the Casey plurality opinion exemplifies new heights ofjudicial arrogance in
its demand that the American people submit to its judgment regarding the legal
status of the unborn and the morality of abortion," 9 the opinion of the majority in
Stenberg v. Carhart2 ° reflects new lows in judicial respect for facts when
adjudicating constitutional disputes.
As described by the majority, the issue before the Court in Stenberg was
"whether Nebraska's statute, making criminal the performance of a 'partial birth
115. Editors of FIRST THINGS, Introduction to THE END OF DEMOCRACY?: THE JUDICIAL
USURPATION OF POLITICS 3 (Mitchell S. Muncy ed., 1997); see also Charles W. Colson, Kingdoms in
Conflict, in THE END OF DEMOCRACY?: THE JUDICIAL USURPATION OF POLITICS, supra, at 41, 47 ("At
what point does a government become sufficiently corrupt that Christians must actively resist it? [A]nd,
[h]as the United States, under its current judicial regime, reached such a point?").
116. Robert H. Bork, Our Judicial Oligarchy, in THE END OF DEMOCRACY?: THE JUDICIAL
USURPATION OF POLITICS, supra note 115, at 10, 10.
117. Robert P. George, The Tyrant State, in THE END OF DEMOCRACY?: THE JUDICIAL
USURPATION OF POLITICS, supra note 115, at 53, 61.
118. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 979 (Kennedy, J. dissenting) ("Ignoring substantial
medical and ethical opinion, the Court substitutes its ownjudgment for the judgment of Nebraska and
some 30 other States and sweeps the law away.").
119. See supra text accompanying note 108.
120. 530 U.S. 914.
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abortion,' violates the Federal Constitution, as interpreted in [Casey] and [Roe]."'2'
Looking to the dictates of Casey and finding that "substantial medical authority
supports the proposition that banning [this] particular abortion procedure could
endanger women's health,"' 22 the majority concluded that the statute was
unconstitutional because it contained no health exceptions to protect a woman's
life. 123 Yet, the evidence presented to the trial court reveals that the Nebraska
legislature's conclusion that the statute did not require a health exception was well
supported by substantial medical authority.
The plaintiff, Dr. Carhart, was the only witness who had ever performed
partial-birth abortions-"D & X" or "intact D & E" abortions-and he testified that
he only chose to perform a D & X when the fetus was presented in a "footling
breech"'24 or where repositioning the fetus from a side presentation resulted in a
footling breech presentation. 125 Ifthe partial-birth abortion procedure was medically
superior to dismemberment abortion, it would seem that Dr. Carhart would have
repositioned the fetus to allow use of the superior method, but he admittedly did not
do so. 1 26 This fact suggests that his use of the procedure was more a matter of
convenience than of medical necessity.
None of the experts called to testify on the plaintiff s behalf had any experience
with the procedure. Dr. Stubblefield, the expert that the trial court relied upon
extensively, "ha[d] not performed this procedure himself, nor ha[d] he viewed
anyone else perform it., 121 Similarly, Dr. Carhart's other expert, Dr. Hodgson,
"performed or supervised at least 30,000 abortions"'28 and yet had never
"intentionally performed an intact D & E.' ' 129 Notwithstanding these experts' lack
of experience with the procedure, both doctors were confident that some
circumstances existed in which the protection of a woman's health would require
its use.
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) expressed
similar unfounded confidence:
A select panel convened by ACOG could identify no
circumstances under which this procedure [intact D & X] would
121. Id. at 929 30 (citations omitted).
122. Id. at 938.
123. Id. at 930 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (joint opinion
of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.)). The majority further determined that the statute was
unconstitutional because the definition of the proscribed procedure "covers a much broader category
of procedures" than partial-birth abortion. See id. at 939. The Court interpreted the statute to include
dismemberment "D & E" abortions, see id. at 944 46, which "(together with a modified form of
vacuum aspiration used in the early second trimester) accounts for about 95% ofall abortions performed
from 12 to 20 weeks of gestational age," id. at 924. While the second holding required judicial
gymnastics to avoid application of the common canon of construction that requires courts to adopt
narrowing constructions to avoid constitutional infirmity, that issue is not the focus of this Article's
critique.
124. The district court opinion defined "footling breech" as a "feet-first position." Carhart v.
Stenberg, 972 F. Supp. 507, 521 (D. Neb. 1997).
125. Id. at 521 & n.20.
126. Id.
127. Carhart v. Stenberg, II F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1112 (D. Neb. 1998).
128. Id. at H105 n.9.
129. Id. at 1107.
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be the only option to save the life or preserve the health of the
woman. An intact D & X, however, may be the best or most
appropriate procedure in a particular circumstance to save the life
or preserve the health of a woman, and only the doctor, in
consultation with the patient, based upon the woman's particular
circumstances can make this decision. 130
The American Medical Association (AMA) expressed a more objective opinion
when it stated that "there does not appear to be any identified situation in which
intact D&X is the only appropriate procedure to induce abortion.'' In furtherance
of that position-and during the 1997 congressional attempt to ban this
procedure-the AMA issued a press release supporting the proposed Federal
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban of 1997. The AMA press release described the partial-
birth abortion procedure as "broadly disfavored-both by experts and the
public .... It is a procedure which is never the only appropriate procedure and has
no history in peer reviewed medical literature or in accepted medical practice
development."' 3 2 The AMA's Fact Sheet on HR 1122 stated that "[i]ntact D&X is
not an accepted 'medical practice,' ...... [T]he Board's expert scientific report
recommends against its use."' 33
Public statements of a recognized abortion expert support the foregoing
conclusion of the AMA: "'I have very serious reservations about this procedure,'
said Colorado physician Warren Hem, MD. The author of Abortion Practice, the
nation's most widely used textbook on abortion standards and procedures, Dr. Hem
specializes in late-term procedures."' 34 Regarding intact D & E's, Dr. Hem stated,
"'You really can't defend it."",1
35
At the time Stenberg was being litigated, the only medical textbook to discuss
partial-birth abortion was the result of an editorial effort by the National Abortion
Federation a group comprised of North American abortion providers.'36 The text
contained no claim that the technique was ever medically necessary. Rather, the
authors wrote the following:
130. AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, ABORTION POLICY 3 (2004) (first
emphasis added). The district court specifically relied on this language. See Stenberg, 11 F. Supp. 2d
at 1105 n.10.
131. AM. MED. ASS'N, H-5.982 LATE-TERM PREGNANCY TERMINATION TECHNIQUES, available
at http://www.ama-assn.org/apps/pf new/pf onlinef n-resultLink&doc-policyfiles/HnE/1H-5.982.
HTM&s t-h-5.982&catg-AMA/HnE&catg-AMA/BnGnC&catg-AMA/DIR&&nth- 1 &&st_p
-0&nth- & (last visited June 1, 2008).
132. See Brief Amici Curiae ofAss'n of American Physicians and Surgeons et al. in Support of
Petitioners at app., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (No. 99-830), 2000 WL 228448
(reproducing Press Release, Am. Med. Ass'n, AMA Supports H.R. 1122 as Amended (May 20, 1997)).
133. See id (reproducing AM. MED. ASS'N, FACT SHEET ON H.R. 1122 (1997)). Notwithstanding
the AMA's clear reliance on the absence of evidence regarding the safety and necessity of the
procedure, and its refusal to rely on mere speculation, the district court characterized the AMA's
statements as "irrelevant" and "political rhetoric." Carhart v. Stenberg, 972 F. Supp. 507, 525 n.27 (D.
Neb. 1997).
134. Diane M. Gianelli, Outlawing Abortion Method: Veto-Proof Majority in House Votes to
Prohibit Late-Term Procedure, AM. MED. NEws, Nov. 20, 1995, at 3.
135. Id.
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Intact D&E is used as a method of second trimester abortion and,
in the case of compromised pregnancies, as a technique for third
trimester terminations. Intactness allows unhampered evaluation
of structural abnormalities and can be an aid to patients grieving
a wanted pregnancy by providing the opportunity for a final act
of bonding.'
3 7
Only under the Court's overly-expansive definition of "health" in Doe v. Bolton 3 '
could a plaintiffsuccessfully assert that a law regulating abortion unconstitutionally
burdens a woman's right to obtain an abortion because it interferes with evaluation
of fetal structural abnormalities and fails to assist a patient's grieving process.
The substantial medical authority relied upon by the majority in overturning the
partial-birth abortion bans of thirty-one states"3 9 included only the testimony of a
single physician plaintiff, and unsubstantiated speculation by his experts and a
professional association. Just as Roe was based on selective review of the history
of abortion, Stenberg was based on selective review of the medical evidence
regarding the necessity of partial-birth abortion to preserve a woman's health.
Similar to Casey's command that the people submit to the Court's judgment
regarding the legality of abortion, Stenberg commanded Americans to accept
physicians initiating childbirth for the purpose of killing the child immediately
before the child emerged from the womb. 40 Such was the state of abortion law
when Judge John G. Roberts, Jr., was confirmed as Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court.
IV. EARLY RETURNS FROM THE ROBERTS' COURT: AYoTTE AND GONZALES
A. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England
The question of whether a "health exception" is required in every law related
to abortion returned to the Court in one of the first cases to be decided during Chief
Justice Roberts's tenure. In Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New
England,4' the constitutionality ofNew Hampshire's parental notification law was
137. W. Martin Haskell, Thomas R. Easterling & E. Steve Lichtenberg, Surgical Abortion After
the First Trimester, in A CLINICIAN'S GUIDE TO MEDICAL AND SURGICAL ABORTION, supra note 136,
at 123, 136.
138. See 410 U.S. 179, 192(1973).
139. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 979 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Ignoring
substantial medical and ethical opinion, the Court substitutes its own judgment for the judgment of
Nebraska and some 30 other States and sweeps the law away.").
140. See id at 963. In his dissent, Justice Kennedy noted,
D & X's stronger resemblance to infanticide means Nebraska could conclude the
procedure presents a greater risk of disrespect for life and a consequent greater
risk to the profession and society, which depend for their sustenance upon
reciprocal recognition of dignity and respect. The Court is without authority to
second-guess this conclusion.
Id. The difficulty in distinguishing the practice of partial-birth abortion from infanticide is the primary
point argued in the amnicus brief filed in the Supreme Court on behalf of the states of Louisiana and
Mississippi. See Brief of Amici Curiae Louisiana and Mississippi in Support of Petitioners at 1,
Stenberg, 530 U.S. 914 (No. 99-830), 2000 WL 228483.
141. 546 U.S. 320 (2006).
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challenged because the law did not contain an express exception allowing
performance of an abortion on a minor without parental notice in cases where the
performance ofthe abortion was necessary to preserve the minor's health.14 2 During
committee hearings, legislators had debated whether a health exception was
constitutionally required due to the holding of Stenberg. At the time of the debates,
only the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had considered the
question,'43 and it had concluded that Stenberg required a health exception in every
law related to abortion, including laws requiring parental notification.'44 Opponents
of the required inclusion of a health exception argued that the breadth of the
exception-at least as articulated in Doe v. Bolton 45-effectively eliminated any
requirement of parental involvement.'46 They pointed to the fact that the Supreme
Court had approved a Minnesota parental notification law that had no health
exception 4 in Hodgson v. Minnesota.'48 Ultimately, opponents of the required
inclusion of a health exception won the day, and the law was codified with only an
exception for emergency abortions to preserve the life of the mother.'49
New Hampshire abortion providers immediately challenged the law, in part due
to the absence of a health exception.' The Office of New Hampshire Attorney
General Peter Heed replied, arguing that the providers had not established their
entitlement to facially attack the statute.' The reply contained no challenges to the
142. Id. at 326. The Act allowed a physician to bypass parental notification in cases where "the
abortion is necessary to prevent the minor's death and there is insufficient time to provide the required
notice." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132.26(I)(a) (LexisNexis 2006) (repealed June 29, 2007). The Act also
allowed a pregnant minor to bypass parental notification by obtaining a court order ruling that she was
"mature and capable of giving informed consent to the proposed abortion" or that "the performance of
an abortion upon her without notification of her parent, guardian, or conservator would be in her best
interests." Id. § 132.26(11) (repealed June 29, 2007).
143. See Planned Parenthood of the Rocky Mountains Servs., Corp. v. Owens, 287 F.3d 910,
916-17 (10th Cir. 2002).
144. Id. at 917 18.
145. See 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
146. Stephen Frothingham, Heed Will Fight Ruling on Abortion, CONCORD MONITOR, Dec. 30,
2003, available at www.cmonitor.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID-/20031231 REPOSITORY/
312310326 ("We didn't mistakenly forget to put in a health exception. We purposely crafted a bill
without an exception,' said Rep. Fran Wendelboe, a Republican from New Hampton. She said a health
exception would be an 'open door.' 'It would pretty much mean you would have no parental notice at
all. Because who makes the decision about what is a health exception'? The abortionist, who is already
100 percent gung-ho to do an abortion,' she said.").
147. See Phyllis Woods, Parental Notijication Protects Young Girls, CONCORD MONITOR, Nov.
30, 2005, available at wvww.cmonitor.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article'?AID-/20051201 /REPOSITORY/
512010334.
148. See 497 U.S. 417, 422 23 (1990). The continuing viability of Hodgson is evidenced by its
citation in Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 298 n.4 (1997) (per curiam) (citing Hodgson, 497 U.S.
at 497 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)), and Planned
Parenthood of Northern New England v. Heed, 390 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Hodgson, 497
U.S. at 417).
149. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132.26(I) (LexisNexis 2006) (repealed June 29, 2007).
150. See Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng. v. Heed, 296 F. Supp. 2d 59, 61-62 (D.N.H. 2003).
151. See id. at 62-63. Former Attorney General Heed resigned from office after filing an appeal
of the trial court's judgment, due to allegations that he had acted inappropriately toward a state
employee at a conference. Allison Steele, Revisiting the Stories that Were, CONCORD MONITOR, Dec.
30, 2004, available at wvww.cmonitor.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID-/20041231 REPOSITORY/
412310302. Former Attorney General Heed was subsequently cleared of any criminal wrongdoing, and
questions were raised about whether he was improperly pressured to resign. Id.
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factual assertions contained in plaintiffs' affidavits, nor was there any attempt to
present evidence establishing that a health exception was unnecessary. 52 The
state's failure to challenge the assertions contained in plaintiffs' affidavits and to
present evidence of other states' experiences with parental notification laws reduced
the case to legal questions regarding the propriety of facial challenges and the
applicability of Stenberg to parental involvement laws.'53 This was a serious
mistake.
New Hampshire might well have prevailed in the district court if the attorney
general had challenged the plaintiffs' representation of the facts. The affidavits
presented by plaintiffs contained no statements that the witnesses had ever been
required to perform an emergency abortion in order to preserve a minor's health.
154
Instead, similar to the expert opinion in Stenberg, the witnesses speculated about
various possible conditions or circumstances that would require the performance
of an abortion prior to the notification of a minor's parent.'1 5 Their reliance upon
mere speculation, along with the absence of testimony regarding actual cases that
required emergency abortions, is significant in light ofthe experience in other states
that require parental involvement.
For example, Minnesota's parental involvement law has been in effect for over
twenty years and has no health exception. 156 During the initial six years when
parental notification was required (prior to a brief period of nonenforcement due to
consideration of constitutional challenges inHodgson), there was not a single report
of medical complications caused by the law, or a single case of parental prevention
or coercion of an abortion:
[A]fter some five years of the [parental involvement] statute's
operation, the evidence does not disclose a single instance of
abuse or forceful obstruction of abortion for any Minnesota
minor. The plaintiffs also conceded that there was no evidence of
any increase in medical complications which could be attributed
to the law.1
7
152. Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of Objection to Request for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief, Heed, 296 F. Supp. 2d 59 (No. Civ-03-491 -JD), 2003 WL 25494036; see also Heed,
296 F. Supp. 2d at 62 ("The Attorney General filed an objection, and the plaintiffs filed a reply. No
surreply was filed. The parties have agreed that the court may decide the plaintiffs' requests for a
declaratory judgment and permanent injunctive relief on the merits based on their present filings.").
153. See Heed, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 62-66.
154. See Declaration of Wayne Goldner, M.D., Heed, 296 F. Supp. 2d 59 (No. Civ-03-491-JD),
2006 WL 4099372; Declaration ofRachel Atkins, P.A., M.P.H., Heed, 296 F. Supp. 2d 59 (No. Civ-03-
491-JD), 2003 WL 25481704.
155. Rachel Atkins affidavit merely stated, "I fear that, without a proper health exception, minors
who fear notifying their parents of their abortion decision will be deterred from seeking and obtaining
abortions they need in urgent medical circumstances." Declaration of Rachel Atkins, supra note 154,
at 10. Dr. Goldner's affidavit merely describes various conditions that may require emergency
abortions but contains no statement that he ever has been presented with such a case. See Declaration
of Wayne Goldner, supra note 154 at 8, 10, 12-14.
156. See Act of May 19, 1981, ch. 228, 1981 Minn. Laws 1011 (codified as amended at MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 144.343 (2005)).
157. Brief of Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty & North Dakota Governor John Hoeven as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at apps. 2, 7, Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546
U.S. 320 (2006) (No. 04-1144), 2005 WL 2046362 (reproducing Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Background
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A review of the Health Department statistics following the Hodgson case makes
clear that the state's parental notification law has not resulted in increased
complications or harm to minors' health." 8
Minnesota's record of few emergency abortions is similar to that of other states
providing public reports regarding the circumstances surrounding abortion:
No medical emergency abortions have been reported in the last
four years in Alabama, the last six years in Nebraska, the last
three years in Wisconsin, or at any time under the Idaho (four
years), South Carolina (seven years) and Texas (five and one-half
years) statutes since physicians have been required to report
emergency abortions. Almost 30, 000 abortions were performed
on minors in these six States during these years without even one
reported medical emergency.'
The absence of any reports of emergency abortions performed to protect the health
of the mother suggests that speculation regarding pregnancy complications that
would require such abortions is exactly that-speculation-and provides no basis
for constitutional complaint. 6 '
But the district court was not presented with a record reporting the operation
of parental involvement laws in other states. Nor were the plaintiffs' witnesses
required to prove the facts of their claim. So it is unremarkable that the district
court rendered judgment for the plaintiffs and permanently enjoined enforcement
of the New Hampshire law.' This ruling was affirmed by the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit,'62 which declared that Stenberg required the
inclusion of a health exception in every abortion law.'63 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari but did not address the absence of the health exception because the New
Hampshire attorney general did not contest its necessity.'64 Instead, in the first (and
probably last) unanimous opinion regarding abortion laws, the Court assumed
arguendo that the Constitution required a health exception, and remanded the case
to the First Circuit to determine if it was possible to craft an injunction or
declaratory judgment as to the unconstitutional parts of the law while allowing the
rest to remain."'
Briefing Concerning the Minnesota Parent Notification Law (1989)).
158. The Minnesota Department of Health provides annual reports to the legislature regarding
complications arising from abortion. The eight most recent reports are made available on the
department's web site, available at http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/chs/abrpt/abrpt.htm.
159. BriefAmicus Curiae of the Thomas More Society in Support ofPetitioner at 21, Ayotte, 546
U.S. 320 (No. 04-1144), 2005 WL 1865476.
160. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) ("[l]t must be likely,'
as opposed to merely 'speculative,' that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision."')
(quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 43 (1976)); City ofL.A. v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95, 101 (1983) ("Abstract injury is not enough.").
161. See Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng. v. Heed, 296 F. Supp. 2d 59, 68 (D.N.H. 2003).
162. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng. v. Heed, 390 F.3d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 2004).
163. See id. at 60.
164. See Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 327 28.
165. See id. at 323 ("If enforcing a statute that regulates access to abortion would be
unconstitutional in medical emergencies,..., invalidating the statute entirely is not always necessary
or justified, for lower courts may be able to render narrower declaratory and injunctive relief").
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B. Gonzales v. Carhart
Just one year later, the Court again took up the question of whether the
Constitution required a health exception in all abortion-related laws. Consolidating
appeals from the United States Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits,
the Court considered whether the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 is invalid
because it lacks a health exception or is otherwise unconstitutional on its face.'66
Similar to the evidentiary record in Stenberg,167 none of the physicians testifying
at trials just prior to Gonzales could identify a single instance in which they had
intentionally performed a D & X (partial-birth) abortion because it was the
medically superior method of abortion in protecting the health of the mother. 168 In
contrast to Stenberg, by the time of Gonzales a peer-review study of partial-birth
abortion existed, but the study was inconclusive as to whether D & X was superior
to D & E.16 Dr. Chasen, an early advocate of D & X abortion and the author of the
study, testified at trial that according to the study's results, there was no difference
between the partial-birth and dismemberment abortions with regard to the mother's
blood loss, procedure time, or short-term complication rates.'
The two procedures have similar complication rates. Dr. Chasen
admitted that the study did not prove that D & X is superior to D
& E. He also testified that the study could not claim that D & X
was as safe as D & E.
The study showed that for the small group of women for
whom subsequent pregnancy information was available,
spontaneous birth occurred in 2 of 17 (11.8%) of the D & X
group, and 2 of 45 (4.4%) of the D & E group. Although this
difference may be statistically insignificant given the few patients
in the study, it was sufficient to signal a cause for concern for
some of the experts. The study also showed that the D & X group
experienced a higher rate of cervical laceration (2.4%) than the D
& E group (.8%). Dr. Sprang derived this number from the data
in the Chasen study. While the sample size was too small to be
statistically significant, it tends to show that D & X has the
potential to cause more trauma to the cervix. '
166. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1619-20 (2007).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 124 29.
168. See e.g., Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278, 308 (2d Cir. 2006) (Straub, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he plaintiffs and their experts agreed that they had never encountered a situation where
D & X was the only available procedure or where the mother's health required a D & X."); infra note
189 and accompanying text.
169. See Stephen T. Chasen et al., Dilation and Evacuation at > 20 Weeks: Comparison of
Operative Techniques, 190 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1180 (2004).
170. Nat 'lAbortion Fed'n, 437 F.3d at 309 (Straub, J. dissenting); see also Carhart v. Gonzales,
413 F.3d 791, 803 (8th Cir. 2005) ("The study found no significant difference in blood loss, procedure
time, or short-term complication rates between the procedures.").
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These facts led the federal district court in New York to conclude the following:
After hearing all of the evidence, as well as considering the
record before Congress, the Court does not believe that many of
Plaintiffs' purported reasons for why D & X is medically
necessary are credible; rather they are theoretical or false. In
addition, Dr. Chasen's study was initiated with the knowledge
that Congress was considering a partial-birth abortion ban. Not
only did the study fail to prove the alleged safety advantages of
D & X over D & E, it raised serious questions about the potential
health risks to women that D & X poses, namely, the risk of
future preterm births due to increased cervical dilation during a D
& x.
17 2
Nonetheless, the court felt constrained by Stenberg's "substantial medical
authority" standard 173 and struck down the federal Act:
The Government contends that the lack of a health exception
does not make the Act unconstitutional if, looking at the
congressional record supplemented by the trial testimony, the
Court determines that Congress was reasonable in its finding that
D & X is never medically necessary to protect a woman's health.
Stenberg does not countenance that approach. Instead, the
relevant inquiry (assuming, as the Court does, that Turner applies)
is whether Congress reasonably determined, based on substantial
evidence, that there is no significant body of medical opinion
believing the procedure to have safety advantages for some
women.... Under that standard, Congress's factfindings were not
reasonable and based on substantial evidence.
74
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the New York
federal district court. 175 Thus, Justices Thomas and Kennedy were prophetic when
they stated that the standard adopted in Stenberg would render abortion law subject
to the veto of a single physician, allowing a single abortion provider to set
"abortion policy for the State .... not the legislature or the people.' ' 176
The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 was also challenged in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California. 17 7 Initially, Planned
Parenthood brought suit challenging the law because of the absence of a maternal
172. Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
173. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 938 (2000) (citing Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.))
174. Nat'lAbortion Fed'n, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 488 (internal citation omitted).
175. Nat'lAbortion Fed'n, 437 F.3d at 281.
176. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 965 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
177. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
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health exception.'78 The City and County of San Francisco subsequently intervened
as plaintiffs.
179
The identity of the plaintiffs was odd because the Act, by its terms, applies to
only physicians or individuals. 8 ° "Physician" is defined by the Act, and that
definition does not include corporations or government entities.' The lack of the
Act's applicability to the plaintiffs was reinforced by California state law, which
permits only physicians to perform surgical abortions.'82 Thus, there was no threat
of direct enforcement of the Act against the plaintiffs.
Under normal jurisdictional analysis, the absence of a physician plaintiffwould
be fatal to the plaintiffs' case.'83 The Court has noted in the past, "Only those to
whom a statute applies and who are adversely affected by it can draw in question
its constitutional validity in a declaratory judgment proceeding as in any other."' 
84
No doubt the organizational and municipal plaintiffs could have found physicians
to join them in their challenge which would have cured the jurisdictional
defect-but the case should not have proceeded until that occurred.'85 Yet the
plaintiffs' lack of standing was not raised in the district court or the Ninth Circuit,
arguably suggesting an unseemly eagerness to declare the law unconstitutional.
Like the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,'86 the Ninth Circuit read Stenberg
as requiring a health exception and affirmed the district court's ruling of the Act's
unconstitutionality.'
8 7
The Supreme Court granted review, consolidating appeals from the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits.' By the time it heard oral arguments, the Court of Appeals for the
178. See id at 966-67.
179. See id. at 957.
180. See 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. IV 2004).
181. Id. § 1531 (b)(2). Specifically, the Act provides,
[T]he term "physician" means a doctor of medicine or osteopathy legally
authorized to practice medicine and surgery by the State in which the doctor
performs such activity, or any other individual legally authorized by the State to
perform abortions: Provided, however, [t]hat any individual who is not a
physician or not otherwise legally authorized by the State to perform abortions,
but who nevertheless directly performs a partial-birth abortion, shall be subject to
the provisions of this section.
Id.
182. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2253(b)(1) (West 2003). Only natural persons can be
physicians under California law. See id. § 2032; Lathrop v. Healthcare Partners Med. Group, 8 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 668, 673 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (limiting the term "health care provider" to include only
"natural" persons).
183. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 473 (1982).
184. Ala. State Fed'n ofLabor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 463 (1945) (citations omitted); see also
Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279 (1919) ("Considerations of propriety, as well as long-
established practice, demand that we refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of an act of
Congress unless obliged to do so in the proper performance of our judicial function, when the question
is raised by a party whose interests entitle him to raise it." (emphasis added)).
185. See Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 134 (2004) (rejecting third-party standing of
attorneys on behalf of hypothetical, prospective clients).
186. Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791, 803 (8th Cir. 2005).
187. Planned Parenthood Fed'n ofAm., Inc. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163, 1175 76 (9th Cir. 2006).
The court also declared the Act to be unconstitutionally vague and to unduly burden the right to obtain
previability abortions. Id. at 1180, 1184.
188. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1619 20 (2007).
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Second Circuit had also declared the Act unconstitutional.'89 In a bitterly divided
five-to-four vote,' 90 the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits. 9' The Court held that the Act was sufficiently clear to give
physicians adequate warning of the conduct that was prohibited;' 92 that Congress
was within its constitutional authority to proscribe this particular abortion
technique; 193 and that the prohibition did not unduly burden a woman's right to
obtain an abortion.'94 In reaching these conclusions, the majority made clear that
the state's power to regulate abortion is not limited to cases where medical opinion
is undivided:
As illustrated by respondents' arguments and the decisions of the
Courts of Appeals, Stenberg has been interpreted to leave no
margin of error for legislatures to act in the face of medical
uncertainty....
A zero tolerance policy would strike down legitimate abortion
regulations, like the present one, if some part of the medical
community were disinclined to followthe proscription. This is too
exacting a standard to impose on the legislative power, exercised
in this instance under the Commerce Clause, to regulate the
medical profession. Considerations of marginal safety, including
the balance of risks, are within the legislative competence when
the regulation is rational and in pursuit of legitimate ends. When
standard medical options are available, mere convenience does
not suffice to displace them; and if some procedures have
different risks than others, it does not follow that the State is
altogether barred from imposing reasonable regulations. 195
This is significant in determining the constitutionality of other abortion-related
regulations regarding contested medical propositions. 96
189. Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278, 296 (2d Cir. 2006). Due to the timing of
the opinion, this case was not before the Supreme Court. This omission is unfortunate because the
evidentiary record developed in the New York district court, see Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330
F. Supp. 2d 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), is much more comprehensive than those of the California and
Nebraska courts, see Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1019 (N.D.
Cal. 2004); Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 1011 (Neb. 2004).
190. See Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1618.
191. Id. at 1639.
192. Id. at 1627-28.
193. Id. at 1632.
194. Id. at 1637. The Court noted,
Medical uncertainty does not foreclose the exercise of legislative power in
the abortion context any more than it does in other contexts .... The medical
uncertainty over whether the Act's prohibition creates significant health risks
provides a sufficient basis to conclude in this facial attack that the Act does not
impose an undue burden.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
195. Id. at 1638 (internal citations omitted).
196. Examples of such regulation include laws requiring abortion providers to inform women of
the possibility that a fetus feels pain after twenty weeks of development, see Maggie Datiles, Fetal Pain
Legislation: Women Deserve to Know, http://www.culture-of-life.org/content/view/127/98/ (lastvisited
June 3, 2008) (discussing the concept of fetal pain and attempts at fetal pain legislation), or that some
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Justice Ginsburg's dissent attacks the majority for its disregard of precedent, 97
its use of evocative language, 198 and its willingness to defer to congressional
findings of fact. 9 9 She accuses the majority of holding an outdated and
misogynistic view of women, 20 and of denying the role of abortion in promoting
sexual equality. 2 1' The fact that three Justices joined her in asserting this last
point2 2 evidences a further shift in the constitutional grounding of abortion rights.
What began as a right grounded in the privacy of the patient physician
relationship 2 3 subsequently became a woman's liberty interest encompassed in the
Due Process Clause.20 4 To redefine the right as emanating from the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would permit heightened scrutiny of all
abortion-related regulations,2 5 which in turn would probably result in a repudiation
of Casey's claim of greater respect for legislative judgments dealing with this
deeply divisive issue.20 6 Such a future, however, requires the persuasion of at least
one additional Justice on the issue of the centrality of abortion to women's equal
status in society.
V. PREDICTIONS OF THE FUTURE
Assuming that the current Court's balance on the issue of abortion continues,
it seems most likely that there will be gradual contraction of the Court's supervision
of abortion legislation and regulation. The Gonzales majority's denunciation of
facial challenges as the means of testing abortion laws20 7 suggests that more state
laws will go into effect prior to or concurrent with defense of those laws from
research supports the conclusion that abortion increases the risk of breast cancer, see Abortion-Breast
Cancer News Headlines, http://www.abortionbreastcancer.com/news/031216/ (last visited June 3, 2008)
(discussing legislation that requires abortion providers to notify patients of the potential link between
abortion and breast cancer).
197. See Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
198. See id. at 1650.
199. See id
200. See id. at 1649 ("This way of thinking reflects ancient notions about women's place in the
family and under the Constitution ideas that have long since been discredited.").
201. See id. at 1641.
202. See id at 1640.
203. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
204. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (joint opinion of
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
205. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) ("Parties who seek to defend gender-
based government action must demonstrate an exceedingly persuasive justification for that action."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
206. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 871.
207. See 127 S. Ct. at 1638-39. Specifically, the Court noted,
The considerations we have discussed support our further determination that
these facial attacks should not have been entertained in the first instance. In these
circumstances the proper means to consider exceptions is by as-applied challenge.
The Government has acknowledged that preenforcement, as-applied challenges
to the Act can be maintained. This is the proper manner to protect the health of the
woman if it can be shown that in discrete and well-defined instances a particular
condition has or is likely to occur in which the procedure prohibited by the Act
must be used. In an as-applied challenge the nature of the medical risk can be
better quantified and balanced than in a facial attack.
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constitutional attacks. This is a major victory for the democratic process, because
many abortion laws are never enforced due to plaintiffs' immediate attacks through
the courts, which in turn lead government officials to settle to avoid expensive and
protracted litigation.'2° This shift to as-applied challenges also suggests that
constitutional attacks will require evidence of actual harms that have occurred or
are certain to occur, rather than mere speculation that some women will some day
experience some problem that might result in an unconstitutional application of the
statute.
20 9
The Ayotte Court's emphasis on narrow relief"' also foretells greater restraint
by courts in cases where the court can sever offending provisions while leaving a
majority of the statute intact or where the court can tailor relief to address the
particular circumstances in which application of the statute would be
unconstitutional. This will allow statutes and regulations to be applied in the
common circumstances that were most likely the basis of the legislation, while
ensuring that the rare or exceptional circumstances are properly addressed, if and
when they arise.
There is also some evidence that the Court will place greater emphasis on the
requirements of constitutional and prudential standing prior to adjudicating
constitutional claims in this area. At least three federal courts of appeals have
rejected facial attacks on abortion-related statutes that contain only civil remedies,
because the Government may not be permitted to seek such relief under the terms
of the statute, 211 or the Government is at least no more likely to seek such relief than
other entities or persons.212
Finally, there is some reason to hope that the Court will more skeptically regard
abortion providers' claims that they represent the interest of women rather than
their own commercial and political interests. While the overturning of Singleton v.
Wulff 3 does not appear in the offing, Justice Kennedy's recognition that abortion
is not uniformly beneficial to women is promising.214 Notwithstanding Justice
Ginsburg's outrage at the suggestion that some women suffer psychological harm
from abortions,215 medical and psychological research is increasingly confirming
this to be the case. Women who have had abortions "experience varying degrees of
208. Almost all challenges to abortion laws filed in federal courts are filed as claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1988, which provides for payment ofplaintiff's attorney fees if the suit is successful. However,
there is no provision for the payment of the Government's fees ifthe plaintiffloses. Because these cases
often involve plaintiff s lawyers who specialize in the area and state attorneys who have rarely, if ever,
defended cases involving abortion, the risks of losing a case are high-independent of the constitutional
validity of the statute or regulation. In some cases, this problem is further compounded by the defending
attorneys having a preexisting political commitment to maintaining abortion rights, which has been a
basis of their campaign for public office. For an example of a case dealing with abortion challenges and
attorney fees under § 1988, see Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986).
209. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 180-88 (2000)
(discussing the constitutional requirements for standing).
210. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 330 31 (2006).
211. See Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405,426-27 (5th Cir. 2001); Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d
857, 875-76 (7th Cir. 1999), vacatedon other grounds, 530 U.S. 1271 (2000); Summit Med. Assocs.,
P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1341 42 (1lth Cir. 1999).
212. See Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1155 58 (10th Cir. 2005).
213. 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
214. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1634 (2007).
215. See id. at 1648 49 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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emotional distress" '216 and are more likely to exhibit self-destructive behaviors.217
Several studies have shown surprising, increased rates of suicide following
abortion.21 This phenomena is not seen after miscarriage.2"9
VI. CONCLUSION
Each of these possibilities limiting facial attacks on abortion laws, narrow
crafting of remedies for unconstitutional provisions, increased emphasis on the
requirements of constitutional and prudential standing, and greater skepticism
regarding abortion providers' claims ofrepresenting the interests ofwomen-bodes
well for the political health of this country. If the Court embraces these positions,
collective self-governance over the difficult and divisive question of abortion will
largely be restored. But these steps, while important and worthwhile, will not afford
protection for the most vulnerable among us-the unborn. To do that, the Court
would have to reverse Roe outright, either on the basis that the Constitution does
not limit the ability of states to prohibit abortion or on the basis that the unborn are
persons within the protection of the Constitution. At this time, it appears unlikely
that ChiefJustice Roberts or Justice Kennedy would supply the necessary fifth vote
to reverse Roe, and there is no evidence that any Justice is willing to assert the
constitutional personhood of the unborn.22
216. ELIZABETH RING-CASSIDY & IAN GENTLES, WOMEN'S HEALTH AFTER ABORTION: THE
MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE 131 (2d ed. 2003); see also Anna Glasier, Counseling for
Abortion, in MODERN METHODS OF INDUCING ABORTION 112, 117 (David T. Baird et al. eds., 1995)
("For most women, abortion is emotionally painful."); Jo Ann Rosenfeld, Emotional Responses to
Therapeutic Abortion, 45 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 137, 137 38 (1992) (discussing the complicated
emotional response of women and their families to therapeutic abortions). Additional sources are
collected and discussed in Thomas R. Eller, Informed Consent Civil Actions for Post-Abortion
Psychological Trauma, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 639 (1996).
217. RING-CASSIDY & GENTLES, supra note 216, at 189 ("Post-abortion behaviors tend to be self-
destructive and include suicide, both actual and attempted; deliberate self-harm such as mutilation and
other punishments; unconscious self-harm in the form of substance abuse, smoking, and various eating
disorders; and unstable, often abusive and battering, relationships .... [T]he suicide rate following
abortion is six times greater than that following childbirth, and three times the general suicide
rate .. "); see also Henry P. David et al., Postpartum and Postabortion Psychotic Reactions, 13 FAM.
PLAN. PERSP. 88 (1981) (analyzing the psychological effects of abortion); Mika Gissler et al., Suicides
After Pregnancy in Finland, 1987 94: Register Linkage Study, 313 BRIT. MED. J. 1431, 1433 (1996)
(discussing the high rate of post-abortion suicides in Finland).
218. See, e.g., John M. Thorp, Jr. et al., Long-Term Physical and Psychological Health
Consequences of Induced Abortion: Review of the Evidence, 58 OBSTETRICAL & GYNECOLOGICAL
SURV. 67 (2003) (showing that American women who had abortions were 2.5 times more likely to die
of suicide). A Finnish study showed that women who had abortions were 3.1 times more likely to die
from suicide than nonpregnant women, and 6.0 times more likely to die from suicide than women who
completed their pregnancy. See Gissler et al., supra note 217, at 1433. In England, psychiatric hospital
admissions because of suicide attempts are almost three times more likely for women after induced
abortion. See Christopher L. Morgan et al., Suicides After Pregnancy, 314 BRIT. MED. J. 902, 902
(1997). A survey of Minnesota high school students found that adolescent girls were ten times more
likely to attempt suicide in the six months after an abortion than adolescents who did not have abortions.
B. GARFINKEL ET AL., STRESS, DEPRESSION AND SUICIDE: A STUDY OF ADOLESCENTS IN MINNESOTA,
RESPONDING TO HIGH RISK YOUTH 43 55 (1986).
219. Thorp et al., supra note 218, at 74 (miscarriage referred to medically as "spontaneous
abortion").
220. See Schlueter & Bork, supra note 52.
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For those of us who believe that abortion is "nothing short of an act of violence
against innocent human life,"' 22 this prognosis is hopeful, but not joyful. We must
continue the difficult work of persuading our families, friends, and neighbors that
the value of each human life arises from the fact that the life is human, not from the
fact that the creation of that life is planned or wanted by others. We must pass
legislation that affords all the protections of parents and their unborn children
permitted under the Court's interpretation of the Constitution. We must then pass
legislation that exceeds that interpretation to challenge the Court to allow greater
protections. We must elect public officials that will take serious their obligation to
defend these laws, notwithstanding the appearance of overwhelming strength on the
side of those who demand that abortion remain legal. Finally, we must anticipate
and combat the new threats to human life and dignity arising from unbridled
scientific experimentation, so that fifty years from now we are not fighting similar
battles over new monstrous practices that allow for the taking or distorting of
human life. Winning these battles in the legal arena will require far more than
skilled advocates and modest judges. It will require men and women who are
committed to the idea that justice requires recognition and protection of the innate
value of every human being.
221. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (joint opinion of O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
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